Introduction

40
Both people and animals typically avoid choosing the risky option when 41 confronted with two options of the same mean value but differing in uncertainty (Rode 42 et al., 1999; Bateson, 2002) . The decision to take a particular action depends on 43 subjective preferences and objective rewards. In axiomatic microeconomic theory, 44 preferences are represented by utility and an optimal choice is made by maximization of 45 utility. The utility of a choice with uncertain outcomes is its expected utility, and is 46 determined by summing the utility of each possible outcome weighted by its probability 47 (Bernoulli, 1738 ; Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) . Risk preference implies a 48 particular shape for the utility function. The inverse relationship between risk and 49 expected utility should be logarithmic rather than linear (Bernoulli, 1738) . This should 50 be consistent with the fact that a small amount of money means a larger increase in 51 utility to the poor than to the rich. Thus, the representation of preferences over gambles 52 by the utility function embodies the property of risk aversion and implies a concave 53 shape for the function (Jehle and Reny, 2001 ).
54
Several anomalies of the expected utility theory have been well documented in 55 experimental economics, the most important being the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) . As 56 a result, a number of generalizations have been proposed (Tversky and Kahneman, 57 1992). The most prominent theoretical alternative is the prospect theory (Kahneman and 58 Tversky, 1979) . This psychological approach posits that what influences risk attitudes is 59 not the expected outcome of a choice but the distinct reactions to gains and losses; 60 expected utility theory is right (and people are really risk averse) only for gains.
61
Cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) updates prospect theory to 62 consider high-and low probabilities. People are risk averse for gains of high probability 63 but also for losses of low probability, and are risk seeking for losses of high probability 64 but also for gains of low probability. Such developments justify why the same person 65 can show distinct attitudes toward risk, such as insuring a car used to drive to the 66 casino. The anomalies (Camerer et al., 2005) and prospect theory itself (Trepel et al., 67 2005) seem to be tuned to the functioning of the brain.
68
Not only psychology but also neurobiology can further contribute to our 69 understanding of decision-making involving risk (Platt and Huettel, 2008) . In terms of 70 the brain processes involved, expected utility theory (and for that matter all rational-71 choice models of optimization) implicitly assumes that behavior is the result of 72 decisions that are both controlled and rational, and thus they occur in the cerebral cortex 73 3 (Camerer et al., 2005) . However, decisions can also be spontaneous (Schneider and 74 Shiffrin, 1977; Bargh et al., 1996) and emotional (Zajonc, 1980; Panksepp, 1998 effects associated with the emotional amygdala-based system (Botvinick et al., 2001 ).
96
The other limbic area of particular interest in our study is the posterior cingulate found to be risk prone.
133
We set a similar experiment with preschool children using real fruit juice but, 
148
Deviations from the predictions of axiomatic choice theory can sometimes be 149 explained by emotion, as proposed by disappointment (Bell, 1985) and regret theory 150 (Bell, 1982) . Thus, our experiment also considered the possible influence of emotions in 
160
We also considered the 2D:4D digit ratio of the children participating in our 161 experiment. High prenatal testosterone levels, low prenatal estrogens, or both cause low 162 digit ratios (Manning, 2002 We hypothesized that negative learning − calls for a change in the previous 196 risky choice, while positive learning + induces repetition of the risky option choice.
197
We found that negative learning influenced children's choice of the risky option by 
212
We sought to know whether any of the variables considered were systematically procedures of the experiment and seeking permission for their children to participate.
248
Children from Florianopolis, Brazil, were sampled from six schools. Of the 212 parents 249 that we approached, 47 percent consented and so predetermined the total number of 100 250 subjects who participated in the study.
251
The questionnaire asked for the level of education of parents. In the sample, 59
252 percent of mothers and 52 percent of fathers had a bachelor university degree or above.
253
The questionnaire also sought information about the mother's age. 
Analysis
305
We analyzed data using the logistic regression and quiet children, q ; ij = x 1 for the corresponding opposite variables. Model 317 estimation and variable selection were run using SAS 9.1.
318
Stepwise-, backward-, and forward procedures ensured estimation of a 319 parsimonious model where − was found to be the more relevant explanatory variable.
320
From the 22 children that switched preferences (from risk propensity to risk aversion), = for those that were risk-averse in at least one trial.
335
Now only the variable quiet children, q , was selected, and the estimated model was We found 58 children remaining risk-prone in both trials, but quiet children were found hormones may also play a role, humans are not necessarily born risk averse.
419
Gender differences matter in risk taking (Byrnes et al., 1999 we also considered satiety as another explanatory variable (Section 3.3) only to find that 449 it had no influence in the choices made in the second trial. 
